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Abstract
In a previous paper, we have proposed assigning as the value of a
physical quantity in quantum theory, a certain kind of set (a sieve)
of quantities that are functions of the given quantity. The motivation
was in part physical—such a valuation illuminates the Kochen-Specker
theorem; and in part mathematical—the valuation arises naturally in
the topos theory of presheaves.
This paper discusses the conceptual aspects of this proposal. We
also undertake two other tasks. First, we explain how the proposed
1email: jb56@cus.cam.ac.uk; jeremy.butterfield@all-souls.oxford.ac.uk
2email: c.isham@ic.ac.uk
3Small corrections added in October 1998
valuations could arise much more generally than just in quantum
physics; in particular, they arise as naturally in classical physics.
Second, we give another motivation for such valuations (that applies
equally to classical and quantum physics). This arises from applying
to propositions about the values of physical quantities some general
axioms governing partial truth for any kind of proposition.
1
1 Introduction
In a previous paper [1]—referred to hereafter as (I)—we proposed assigning
as the value of a physical quantity in quantum theory, a certain kind of
set (a sieve) of quantities that are functions of the given quantity. Our
motivation was in part physical—such a valuation illuminates the Kochen-
Specker theorem; and in part mathematical—the valuation arises naturally
in the topos theory of presheaves. These aspects were closely linked. We
interpreted a valuation as assigning truth-values to propositions ‘A ∈ ∆’
asserting that the value of the quantity A lies in the Borel subset ∆ of the
spectrum of the operator Aˆ that represents A. The fact that one quantity can
be a function, or coarse-graining, of another implies that there is a natural
presheaf associated with these propositions. And the theory of presheaves
gives a natural generalization of the FUNC property (viz. that the value of
a function of a given quantity is the function of the value of the quantity),
which plays a central role in the Kochen-Specker theorem.
In this paper, we first show how sieve-valued valuations obeying our gen-
eralization of FUNC arise much more generally than just as the values of
quantities in quantum physics; and accordingly, how the principal results of
(I) can be generalized. In fact, we claim that they are one of the most natural
notions of valuation for any presheaf of propositions, no matter what their
topic. From a physical perspective, a mathematical structure of this type is
indicated whenever the idea of ‘contextual’ statements about the system is
(i) physically appropriate; and (ii) is so in such a way that the set of all pos-
sible such contexts can be regarded as the objects in a category, which then
forms the base category over which the presheaves are defined. As we shall
see, in making this claim we assume about valuations on propositions only
the basic idea that they must be some sort of structure-preserving function
from the set of propositions (with operations such as negation, conjunction
etc. defined on it) to the set of truth values, which is to be some sort of
logical algebra.
That is the task of Section 3—where we show that sieve-valued valuations
arise naturally in classical physics; and Section 4—where we show how such
valuations can arise in even more general contexts. But first, to facilitate
reading the paper, there is a short review of the elements of the theory of
presheaves (more concise than in (I), but with some extra heuristic material),
and of how these ideas were applied in (I) to quantum physics.
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The paper ends with a presentation of another motivation for such val-
uations (Section 5). We will argue that intuitive ideas about what might
be meant by the notion of ‘partial truth’ (applying to any type of proposi-
tion) make sieve-valued valuations very natural. Among these principles, the
main one will be that a proposition is nearer to ‘total truth’, the larger the
subset of its consequences that are themselves totally true. This argument,
and the principles it refers to, is conceptual, not mathematical: indeed, it
will not need the mathematical notions of Section 2, except the idea of a
category—that is compulsory, in order to make sense of the notion of a sieve.
But the argument and its principles can be made precise most naturally by
using the ideas of presheaf theory; in particular, the idea of ‘consequence’
(entailment) can be made precise in terms of the generalized notion of coarse-
graining introduced in Section 4. Again, we shall see that the proposals of
(I) arise from applying these general ideas to propositions about the values
of quantum physical quantities.
We remark incidentally that there are still other motivations for sieve-
valued valuations obeying a generalized FUNC . We discuss philosophical
ones in [2], and physical ones in [3], in each case adding further material. For
example, semantics for intuitionistic logic of the Kripke-Beth type assigns
to each formula as its interpretation, a sieve on a poset; points of which
are, intuitively, possible states of knowledge, so that paths represent possible
courses of enquiry. In [2], we describe how this kind of construction suggests,
as an analogy, our own valuations. In [3], the motivation concerns assigning
to a quantity a Borel subset (rather than an element) of its spectrum; it also
is foreshadowed in (I).
2 Review of Part I
In the first two subsections, we review elements of the theory of presheaves.
In the third, we summarize how this theory was applied in (I) to the Kochen-
Specker theorem, and to the idea of generalised valuations on the physical
quantities in a quantum theory.
3
2.1 Categories, Presheaves and Subobjects
A presheaf X on a small4 category C is a function that:
1. assigns to each C-object A, a set X(A);
2. assigns to each C-morphism f : B → A, a set-function, X(f) : X(A)→
X(B); and
3. makes these assignments in a ‘meshing’ way, i.e., X(idA) = idX(A); and,
if g : C → B, and f : B → A then
X(f ◦ g) = X(g) ◦X(f) (2.1)
where f ◦ g : C → A denotes the composition of f and g.
So intuitively, a presheaf is a collections of sets that vary in a meshing way
between ‘stages’ or ‘contexts’ A,B, . . . that are objects in the category C.
In terms of contravariant and covariant functors, a presheaf on C is a con-
travariant functor from C to the category Set of normal sets. Equivalently,
it is a covariant functor from the ‘opposite’ category5 Cop to Set.
To make the collection of presheaves on C into the objects of a category,
we recall that a morphism between two presheaves X and Y is defined to
be a natural transformation N : X → Y, by which is meant a family of
maps (called the components of N) NA : X(A) → Y(A), A an object in
C, such that if f : B → A is a morphism in C, then the composite map
X(A)
NA−→ Y(A)
Y(f)
−→ Y(B) is equal to X(A)
X(f)
−→ X(B)
NB−→ Y(B). In other
words, we have the commutative diagram
X(A)yNA
Y(A)
X(f)
−→
Y(f)
−→
X(B)yNB
Y(B)
(2.2)
The category of presheaves on C equipped with these morphisms is denoted
SetC
op
.
4A category is said to be small if the collection of objects, and the collection of all
morphisms between a pair of objects, is a set.
5The ‘opposite’ of a category C is a category, denoted Cop, whose objects are the same
as those of C, and whose morphisms are defined to be the same as those of C but with
each arrow reversed in direction.
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Since C is small, it follows that SetC
op
is a topos. But we will not need
the full definition of a topos here[4, 5]: it suffices that it is a category that
behaves much like the category Set, in particular as regards ‘subobjects’—the
analogue of subsets. To this we now turn.
2.2 Subobjects, Sieves and Sections
1. Subobjects: The key idea about subobjects in a topos, which will be
used throughout this paper, is this. Just as an object in Set, i.e., a set X,
has subsets K ⊆ X that are in one-to-one correspondence with set-functions
χK : X → {0, 1}, from X to the special set {0, 1}, where χK(x) = 1 if x ∈ K,
and χK(x) = 0 otherwise; so in a topos, the subobjects K of an object X are
in one-to-one correspondence with morphisms χK : X → Ω, where the special
object Ω in the topos—called the ‘subobject classifier’—forms an object of
possible truth-values, just as {0, 1} does in the category of sets.
We turn to the exact definitions. An object K is said to be a subobject
of X in the category of presheaves if there is a morphism in the category
(i.e., a natural transformation) i : K → X with the property that, for each
stage A, the component map iA : K(A)→ X(A) is a subset embedding, i.e.,
K(A) ⊆ X(A). Thus, if f : B → A is any morphism in C, we get:
K(A)y
X(A)
K(f)
−→
X(f)
−→
K(B)y
X(B)
(2.3)
where the vertical arrows are subset inclusions. In particular, it follows that
K(f) is the restriction of X(f) to K(A).as
It is clear in what way the definitions above generalise the ideas of set
and subset. Namely, a presheaf over the category C consisting of a single
object O corresponds to a set X := X(O); and a subobject of this presheaf
corresponds to a subset of X.
2. Sieves and the Subobject Classifier Ω: To give the generalization
for presheaves of an ordinary subsets’ characteristic function χK : X →
{0, 1}, we first need the idea of a sieve. A sieve on an object A in C is
defined to be a collection S of morphisms in C with codomain A, and with
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the property that if f : B → A belongs to S, and if g : C → B is any
morphism, then f ◦ g : C → A also belongs to S.
With the idea of a sieve, one can immediately define the subobject classi-
fier . It is the presheaf Ω : C → Set defined by:
1. if A is an object in C, then Ω(A) is the set of all sieves on A;
2. if f : B → A, then Ω(f) : Ω(A)→ Ω(B) is defined as
Ω(f)(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} (2.4)
for all S ∈ Ω(A); the sieve Ω(f)(S) is often written as f ∗(S), and
is known as the pull-back to B of the sieve S on A by the morphism
f : B → A.
There are two main aspects to the idea that Ω supplies an object of gen-
eralized truth-values. Both arise from the basic idea mentioned in Section
1: that a valuation on propositions (of any sort, not necessarily about the
values of physical quantities) must be some sort of structure-preserving func-
tion from the set of propositions (with some such operations as negation,
conjunction etc. defined on it) to the set of truth values, which is to be some
sort of logical algebra.
The first aspect is the fact that for any A in C, the set Ω(A) of sieves on
A is a Heyting algebra. This is a logical algebra that is distributive, but more
general than a Boolean algebra: the main difference being in the behaviour
of negation. In this paper, we shall not need the exact definition: we need
only to remark that the Heyting algebra structure of Ω(A) is very natural;
and then to make an ensuing conceptual point.
Specifically, Ω(A) is a Heyting algebra where the partial ordering is de-
fined on S1, S2 in Ω(A) by S1 ≤ S2 if S1 ⊆ S2; so that the unit element
1Ω(A) in Ω(A) is the principal sieve ↓A := {f : B → A} of all arrows
whose codomain is A, and the null element 0Ω(A) is the empty sieve ∅. The
connectives for conjunction and disjunction are defined as6
S1 ∧ S2 := S1 ∩ S2 (2.5)
S1 ∨ S2 := S1 ∪ S2. (2.6)
6The other key connective is the pseudo-complement of S1 relative to S2. This is
defined as S1 ⇒ S2 := {f : B → A | for all g : C → B if f ◦ g ∈ S1 then f ◦ g ∈ S2}.
The negation of an element S is defined as ¬S := S ⇒ 0; so that ¬S := {f : B → A |
for all g : C → B, f ◦ g 6∈ S}.
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The conceptual point is significant. It is that if for some reason a set
of propositions is associated with each A in a category C (perhaps, but not
necessarily, as a presheaf)—so that one is concerned to define contextual
valuations, i.e., valuations associated with each ‘context’ or ‘stage of truth’
A—then the set Ω(A), being a Heyting algebra, forms a ‘algebraically well-
behaved’ target space for such a valuation associated with A.
The second aspect will be prominent in this Section and beyond. It is the
idea of generalizing to presheaves the way that the subsets, K, of an ordinary
set X are in one-to-one correspondence with characteristic functions χK :
X → {0, 1}, from X to the two classical truth-values {0, 1}. More precisely:
the presheaf Ω plays a role for the topos SetC
op
analogous to the set {0, 1}.
That is to say, subobjects of any objectX in this topos (i.e., subobjects of any
presheaf on C) are in one-to-one correspondence with morphisms χ : X→ Ω.
First, let K be a subobject of X. Then there is an associated character-
istic morphism χK : X→ Ω, whose component χKA : X(A)→ Ω(A) at each
A in C is defined as
χKA (x) := {f : B → A | X(f)(x) ∈ K(B)} (2.7)
for all x ∈ X(A).
That the right hand side of Eq. (2.7) actually is a sieve on A follows from
the defining properties of a subobject. Thus, in each ‘branch’ of the category
C going ‘down’ from the stage A, χKA (x) picks out the first member B in that
branch for which X(f)(x) lies in the subset K(B), and the commutative
diagram Eq. (2.3) then guarantees that X(f ◦ h)(x) will lie in K(C) for all
h : C → B. Hence each A in C serves as a possible ‘context’ or ‘stage of
truth’ for an assignment to each x ∈ X(A) of a generalised truth-value which
is a sieve, belonging to the Heyting algebra Ω(A), rather than an element of
the Boolean algebra {0, 1} of normal set theory.
Conversely, each morphism χ : X→ Ω (i.e., each natural transformation
between the presheaves X and Ω) defines a subobject Kχ of X by defining
for each stage of truth A
Kχ(A) := χ−1A {1Ω(A)} = {x ∈ X(A) | χA(x) =↓A} (2.8)
and by defining for each f : B → A, the map Kχ(f) : Kχ(A) → Kχ(B) to
be the restriction of X(f) to Kχ(A):
Kχ(f) := X(f)|Kχ(A). (2.9)
Note that the fact that principal sieves pull back to principal sieves ensures
that Eq. (2.9) implies that, for any x ∈ Kχ(A),
χB(X(f)(x)) = Ω(f)(χA(x)) = Ω(f)(↓A) =↓B (2.10)
so that X(f)(x) ∈ Kχ(B), i.e., Kχ is indeed a subobject of X.
Note how this correspondence between subobjects and characteristic mor-
phisms simplifies in the special case mentioned above (Section 2.2.1), of
presheaves on the category with a single object. In effect, one gets just
two truth-values—the unit element 1Ω(O) and the null element 0Ω(O), at the
single stage of truth O; and the component of the characteristic morphism at
this single stage is just the characteristic function of a subset of X := X(O).
3. Sections of a Presheaf: In any category, a terminal object is defined
to be an object 1 such that, for any object X in the category, there is a
unique morphism X → 1. A global element of an object X is defined to be
any morphism 1→ X. The motivation for this definition is that, in the case
of the category of sets, a terminal object is any singleton set {∗}; and then
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of a set X and
functions from {∗} to X.
For the category of presheaves on C, a terminal object 1 : C → Set can be
defined by 1(A) := {∗} at all stages A in C; if f : B → A is a morphism in
C then 1(f) : {∗} → {∗} is defined to be the map ∗ 7→ ∗. A global element
of a presheaf X is also called a global section. As a morphism γ : 1 → X
in the topos SetC
op
, a global section corresponds to a choice of an element
γA ∈ X(A) for each stage A in C, such that, if f : B → A, the ‘matching
condition’
X(f)(γA) = γB (2.11)
is satisfied.
As discussed in the next Subsection, the Kochen-Specker theorem is
equivalent to the statement that certain presheaves that arise naturally in
quantum theory have no global sections. But on the other hand, a presheaf
may have ‘partial’, or ‘local’, elements even if there are no global ones. In
general, a partial element of an object X in a category with a terminal object
is defined to be a morphism U → X, where U is a subobject of the termi-
nal object 1. In the category of sets, there are no-nontrivial subobjects of
1 := {∗}, but this is not the case in a general topos. In particular, in the case
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of presheaves on C, a partial element of a presheaf X is an assignment γ of
an element γA to a certain subset of objects A in C—what we shall call the
domain dom γ of γ—with the properties that (i) the domain is closed down-
wards in the sense that if A ∈ dom γ and f : B → A, then B ∈ dom γ; and
(ii) for objects in this domain, the matching condition Eq. (2.11) is satisfied.
2.3 Some Applications to Quantum Physics
In this final Subsection, we will illustrate how the notions reviewed in this
Section can be applied to the topic of valuations in quantum theory. Again,
we will be concise and pick out just some of the main ideas of (I), leaving
some to be generalized in later Sections, and some wholly unmentioned.
1. Categories of Quantities and the Kochen-Specker Theorem: We
first introduce the set Od of all bounded self-adjoint operators with purely
discrete spectra, Aˆ, Bˆ, . . . on the Hilbert space H of a quantum system. We
turn Od into a category by defining the objects to be the elements of Od,
and saying that there is a morphism from Bˆ to Aˆ if there exists a real-
valued function f on σ(Aˆ) ⊂ IR, the spectrum of Aˆ, such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ)
(with the usual definition of a function of a self-adjoint operator, using the
spectral representation). If Bˆ = f(Aˆ), for some f : σ(Aˆ) → IR, then the
corresponding morphism in the category Od will be denoted fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ.
We next form a presheaf on the category Od from the spectra of its
objects. The spectral presheaf on Od is the covariant functor Σ : Od
op → Set
defined as follows:
1. On objects: Σ(Aˆ) := σ(Aˆ)—the spectrum of Aˆ.
2. On morphisms: If fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ, so that Bˆ = f(Aˆ), then Σ(fOd) :
σ(Aˆ)→ σ(Bˆ) is defined by Σ(fOd)(λ) := f(λ) for all λ ∈ σ(Aˆ).
With these definitions, we can state one version of the Kochen-Specker
theorem in terms of presheaves. For recall that one form of the theorem
asserts that if dimH > 2, there does not exist an assignment V to each
object of Od (i.e., each bounded self-adjoint operator on H with a discrete
spectrum) of a member of its spectrum, such that the so-called ‘functional
composition principle’ (for short: FUNC ) holds, viz. that for any pair Aˆ, Bˆ
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such that Bˆ = f(Aˆ):
V (Bˆ) = f(V (Aˆ)). (2.12)
But this is precisely the ‘matching condition’, Eq. (2.11), in the definition
of a global element, as applied to the spectral presheaf. Thus, in this form,
the Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to the statement that, if dimH >
2, there are no global elements of the spectral presheaf Σ : Od
op → Set.
Note that we have restricted attention to operators whose spectra are purely
discrete on the grounds that it is not physically meaningful to assign an exact
value to a quantity that lies in the continuous part of the spectrum of the
associated operator.
2. From Partial Valuations to Generalised Valuations: Our next
observation is that the Kochen-Specker theorem permits the spectral presheaf
to have partial elements, as defined in Section 2.2.3. In more usual, physical
language: it permits partial valuations, i.e., an assignment to each element
Aˆ in some subset, domV , of Od, of a member V (Aˆ) of σ(Aˆ), such that: (i)
domV is closed under taking functions of its members (‘closed under coarse-
graining’); and (ii) for all Aˆ, Bˆ ∈ domV , with Bˆ = f(Aˆ), FUNC , Eq. (2.12),
holds. And there are many such partial valuations (whatever dimH). For
example, each choice of (i) an operator Mˆ with a purely discrete spectrum,
and (ii) one of its eigenvalues m ∈ σ(Mˆ), defines a partial valuation: one just
takes domV to be the set of operators Aˆ that are functions of Mˆ , Aˆ = f(Mˆ);
and one defines V (Mˆ) := m, and V (Aˆ) := f(V (Mˆ)) = f(m).
The idea of a partial valuation brings us to our main claims from (I)
(which remain central in this paper). There are in effect three, which we will
state briefly here, but explain in order in this Paragraph and the next two.
1. Given such a partial valuation, there is a natural associated valuation
that:
(a) is defined on all propositions ‘A ∈ ∆’, stating that the value of
the quantity A (represented by the operator Aˆ) lies in ∆, a Borel
subset of σ(Aˆ);
(b) assigns to such a proposition as its value, a sieve on Aˆ in the
category Od.
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These valuations have various properties, in particular an analogue for
sieves of the property FUNC : an analogue that involves the idea of a
pull-back.
2. We then use these properties to generalise the notion of a valuation.
That is, we define a generalised valuation as a map that (i) assigns a
sieve on Aˆ to each proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’, ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ), and (ii) has these
properties.
This definition has the desirable property that it can readily be ex-
tended to the category O of all bounded self-adjoint operators on the
Hilbert space: specifically, a proposition of the type ‘A ∈ ∆’ is phys-
ically (and mathematically) meaningful irrespective of whether or not
the spectrum of Aˆ is purely discrete.
3. We show that a quantum state (a pure state or a mixture) defines such
a generalised valuation in a natural way.
As to (1), the main idea is that—in the discrete case—even if Aˆ is not
in the domain, domV , of a partial valuation V , for given ∆ there might
be one or more functions f such that (i) f(Aˆ) does lie in domV ; and, (ii)
V (f(Aˆ)) ∈ f(∆). This situation prompts three observations.
• First: if a function f satisfies conditions (i) and (ii), then so does g ◦ f
for any g; so the set of morphisms in Od associated with such functions
determines a sieve on Aˆ in Od.
• Second: condition (ii) means that V in effect assigns true (in the usual
classical sense!) to the proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’.
• Third: the proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is weaker than the original propo-
sition ‘A ∈ ∆’, both intuitively (since functions are generally not injec-
tive) and mathematically, in the sense that its representing projector is
larger in the lattice of projectors on H: Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)].
Putting these observations together, we propose to assign to ‘A ∈ ∆’ as a
contextual, partial truth-value at the stage Aˆ, the sieve on Aˆ determined by
the functions obeying (i) and (ii). Formally, we define a generalised valuation
associated with a partial valuation V by
νV (A ∈ ∆) := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ | Bˆ ∈ domV, V (Bˆ) ∈ f(∆)}. (2.13)
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This generalizes the values assigned by V itself, in that V ’s assignments
correspond to those propositions ‘A ∈ ∆’ to which νV assigns the principal
sieve, ↓Aˆ := {fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ}, i.e., the unit 1Ω(Aˆ) of the Heyting algebra Ω(Aˆ).
We call this the totally true truth-value, trueA. Thus ν
V (A ∈ ∆) = trueA if
(i) Aˆ lies in the domain of V ; and (ii) the value of Aˆ assigned by V lies in
the subset ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ).
These definitions imply that the partial truth-value of ‘A ∈ ∆’ at stage
Aˆ is determined by those weaker propositions ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ that are each
totally true at their stage f(Aˆ). For this partial truth-value just is the sieve
on Aˆ of coarse-grainings f(Aˆ) of Aˆ, at which ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is totally true.
(We shall return to this idea in Section 5.)
Generalised valuations associated with partial valuations have various
properties, of which we here mention just one, since it will be significant in
all later Sections (other properties are listed in the next Paragraph). This
property is the analogue for sieves of the property FUNC . Roughly speaking,
it is that the value of a function of a quantity is the pull-back of the quantity’s
value. To be precise: If fOd : Bˆ → Aˆ, so that Bˆ = f(Aˆ), then
νV (B ∈ f(∆)) = f ∗Od(ν
V (A ∈ ∆)). (2.14)
This property has two welcome consequences. First, we can express the
point of the previous paragraph in terms of pull-backs. For note that for any
category C, with objects A,B, . . ., if S is a sieve on A, and if f : B → A
belongs to S, then
f ∗(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} = {h : C → B} = ↓B. (2.15)
Thus, for any category, the pull-back of a sieve on A by any morphism from
B to A that belongs to the sieve, is the principal sieve on B. Hence the
pull-back of the truth-value of ‘A ∈ ∆’ by a morphism within it, is total
truth at the context (stage of truth) that is the morphism’s domain. Second,
there is a special, and especially intuitive, case of the first point. Since, for
any category, the pull-back of any principal sieve by any morphism is the
principal sieve, we can say: if ‘A ∈ ∆’ is totally true (at stage Aˆ), then every
weaker proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is totally true (at its stage f(Aˆ)).
3. Generalised Valuations and the Coarse-Graining Presheaf: We
turn now to claim (2), and use the various properties possessed by generalised
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valuations associated with partial valuations to define a wider notion of a
generalised valuation that is applicable to the category O of all bounded,
self-adjoint operators. Thus a generalised valuation is defined to be any map
that (i) assigns a sieve on Aˆ to each proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’; and (ii) has these
properties. For the sake of completeness, we state these properties here;
though in the rest of this paper we shall only make substantial use of the
first—which is the sieve-analogue of FUNC (see (I) for the motivation for
the other three):
(i) Functional composition:
For any Borel function f : σ(Aˆ)→ IR we have
ν(f(A) ∈ f(∆)) = f ∗O(ν(A ∈ ∆)). (2.16)
(ii) Null proposition condition:
ν(A ∈ ∅) = ∅ = 0Ω(A) (2.17)
(iii) Monotonicity:
If ∆1 ⊆ ∆2 then ν(A ∈ ∆1) ≤ ν(A ∈ ∆2), i.e. ν(A ∈ ∆1) ⊆ ν(A ∈ ∆2).
(2.18)
(iv) Exclusivity:
If ∆1 ∩∆2 = ∅ and ν(A ∈ ∆1) = trueA, then ν(A ∈ ∆2) < trueA. (2.19)
For later use in this paper, we also note that our collection of sets of
propositions ‘A ∈ ∆’ at each stage Aˆ can be made more precise; indeed, it
can be regarded as a presheaf, which we call the coarse-graining presheaf G
on O. It is defined as follows:
(i) For each Aˆ in O, the set G(Aˆ) is defined to be the spectral algebra
of Aˆ, i.e., the algebra of spectral projectors Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] for the various
Borel sets ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ); thus, G(Aˆ) can be viewed as the Boolean algebra
of all propositions of the form ‘A ∈ ∆’.
(ii) For each morphism fO : Bˆ → Aˆ: the map G(fO) : G(Aˆ) → G(Bˆ) is
defined by
G(fO)(Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]) := Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] (2.20)
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or, equivalently, on propositions:
G(fO)(‘A ∈ ∆’) := ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’. (2.21)
Note that the proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is equivalent to the proposition
‘A ∈ f−1(f(∆))’, so the action of G(fO) can also be viewed as the
explicit coarse-graining operation
G(fO)(‘A ∈ ∆’) := ‘A ∈ f
−1(f(∆))’ (2.22)
in which G(Bˆ) is identified as the appropriate subset of G(Aˆ).
In (I) we remarked on the fact that, as it stands, the right hand side of
Eq. (2.20) is not well-defined if the function f and the Borel subset ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ)
are such that f(∆) is not a Borel subset of IR. The way around this is to
note that if f(∆) is a Borel subset, then we have
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] = inf
K⊆σ(f(Aˆ))
{Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K] | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K]}(2.23)
= inf
K⊆σ(f(Aˆ))
{Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K] | Eˆ[A ∈ ∆] ≤ Eˆ[A ∈ f−1(K)]}2.24)
= inf
K⊆σ(f(Aˆ))
{Eˆ[f(A) ∈ K] | ∆ ⊆ f−1(J)} (2.25)
where the infimum is taken over all Borel subsets J of σ(f(Aˆ)). If f(∆) is
not a Borel subset of IR, then we use Eq. (2.23) as the definition of Eˆ[f(A) ∈
f(∆)] for the category of operators O.
As we shall see in Section 4 et seq., the presheaf of propositions discussed
above, and its generalizations, play a central role in the motivations for, and
properties of, sieve-valued valuations such as the generalised valuations just
defined.
4. Generalised Valuations from Quantum States: We turn to our
claim (3) above: that quantum states naturally define generalised valuations
in the above sense. This proceeds as follows.
The standard minimal interpretation of quantum theory holds that a
quantity A possesses a value a if, and only if, the state ψ is an eigenvector of
Aˆ with eigenvalue a; i.e., Aˆψ = aψ: or more generally, that ‘A ∈ ∆’ is true,
if and only if, Eˆ[A ∈ ∆]ψ = ψ. In terms of probability, it holds that ‘A ∈ ∆’
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is true if and only if Prob(A ∈ ∆;ψ) = 1 where Prob(A ∈ ∆;ψ) denotes
the usual quantum mechanical (Born-rule) probability that the result of a
measurement of A will lie in ∆ ⊆ σ(Aˆ) ⊂ IR, given that the quantum state
is ψ.
But in view of the discussion above, it is natural to reflect that even if
ψ is not an eigenvector of Aˆ, it is an eigenvector of coarse-grainings f(Aˆ) of
Aˆ (for example, the unit operator 1ˆ is always such a function7); and hence
we are lead to propose that we should assign to the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ the
sieve of such coarse-grainings for which ψ is in the range of the corresponding
spectral projector Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)]. Thus we define the generalised valuation
νψ associated with a vector ψ ∈ H as
νψ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]ψ = ψ}
= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆);ψ) = 1} (2.26)
where ∆ is a Borel subset of the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of Aˆ. One can check that
νψ has all the properties Eqs. (2.16–2.19) required in the definition of a
generalised valuation.
Furthermore, one can give an exactly analogous definition of the gener-
alised valuation νρ associated with a density matrix ρ. One defines:
νρ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆); ρ) = 1}
= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) = 1}. (2.27)
Again, all the properties required of a generalised valuation are satisfied.
3 Sieve-valued Valuations in Classical Physics
Before developing the conceptual aspects of the ideas of Section 2 in a very
general setting (in the next Section), it is worth seeing how they apply to
classical physics. In the first Subsection, we give a presheaf perspective
on ordinary classical valuations. We first make a category out of the real-
valued functions on phase space that represent classical physical quantities;
we then introduce the analogue of the spectral presheaf, and contrast the
7If desired, and as explained in (I), such ‘trivial’ functions can be removed by replacing
O with the category O∗: defined to be O minus all real multiples of the unit operator.
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classical existence of global sections with the Kochen-Specker theorem; and
we remark that quantisation can be represented as a functor. In the second
Subsection, we motivate sieve-valuations in terms of classical macrostates. In
the third, we generalize this motivation, and present the classical analogue
of generalised valuations associated with a partial valuation.
3.1 A Presheaf Perspective on Orthodox Classical Val-
uations
One usually thinks of quantities and their values in classical physics as fol-
lows. If S is the state space of some classical system, a physical quantity A
is represented by a measurable real-valued function A¯ : S → IR; and then
the value V s(A) of A in any state s ∈ S is simply
V s(A) = A¯(s). (3.1)
Thus all physical quantities possess a value in any state. Furthermore, if
f : IR → IR is a measurable function, a new physical quantity f(A) can be
defined by requiring the associated function f(A) to be
f(A)(s) := f(A¯(s)) (3.2)
for all s ∈ S; i.e., f(A) := f ◦ A¯ : S → IR. Thus by definition, the values of
the quantities f(A) and A satisfy a classical version of FUNC :
V s(f(A)) = f(V s(A)) (3.3)
for all states s ∈ S.
In terms of propositions of the form ‘A ∈ ∆’, where ∆ is a Borel subset
of IR: to each microstate s ∈ S, there corresponds a valuation defined by
V s(A ∈ ∆) =
{
1 if s ∈ A¯−1[∆]
0 otherwise.
(3.4)
Thus the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is assigned the value ‘true’(1) by V s if, and
only if, A¯(s) ∈ ∆.
We turn now to rendering these ideas in terms of presheaves. The notions
introduced in the next two Paragraphs will also be used in later subsections
where we discuss sieve-valued valuations for classical physics.
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1. The Category of Measurable Functions on S: Let S be a classical
state space, and letM denote the set of all real-valued measurable functions
on S; thus each quantity A is represented by one8 such function A¯ : S → IR.
We now regard M as a category where: (i) the objects are the real-valued
measurable functions on S; and (ii) we say there is a morphism from B¯ to
A¯ if there exists a measurable function f : S(A¯) → IR such that B¯ = f ◦ A¯
(i.e., B¯(s) = f(A¯(s)), for all s ∈ S), where
S(A¯) := A¯(S) = {r ∈ IR | ∃s ∈ S, r = A¯(s)} (3.5)
is the set of all possible values that the physical quantity A could take; it is
the classical analogue of the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of a self-adjoint operator Aˆ in
the quantum theory . The morphism in M corresponding to f : S(A¯)→ IR
will be denoted fM : B¯ → A¯.
2. The Value Presheaf: The analogue of the spectral presheaf in quan-
tum theory is now the following. We define the value presheaf on M to be
the covariant functor Υ :Mop → Set such that:
1. On objects: Υ(A¯) := S(A¯)—the set of all possible values of the quan-
tity A.
2. On morphisms: If fM : B¯ → A¯, so that B¯ = f ◦ A¯, then Υ(fM) :
S(A¯)→ S(B¯) is defined by Υ(fM)(λ) := f(λ) for all λ ∈ S(A¯).
We now observe that a global section of the value presheaf Υ is a function
γ that assigns to each object A¯ in the categoryM, an element γA¯ ∈ S(A¯) in
such a way that if fM : B¯ → A¯ (so that B¯ = f ◦ A¯), then Υ(fM)(γA¯) = γB¯;
in other words
γB¯ = f(γA¯). (3.6)
Thus each global section corresponds to a classical valuation that satisfies
classical FUNC , as in Eq. (3.3). Conversely, each such valuation determines
a global section of the value presheaf. Clearly, the key difference from the
situation in quantum theory (the Kochen-Specker theorem) is that the clas-
sical presheaf does have global sections: namely, each microstate s ∈ S,
8Strictly speaking, functions that differ only on a set of Lebesgue measure zero should
be identified; but we shall ignore this subtlety here.
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determines a global section γs defined by
γsA¯ := A¯(s) (3.7)
for all stages of truth A¯.
3. Quantisation as a Functor From M to O: We remark incidentally
that we can represent in terms of M one of the main practical problems in
quantum physics; viz. knowing how to ‘quantise’ a given classical system.
More precisely, one wants to associate to each measurable function A¯ : S →
IR, a self-adjoint operator Aˆ; or, perhaps, one seeks to do this for some special
subset of classical variables. There is no universal way of performing such a
quantisation; but it is generally agreed that if a physical quantity represented
by A¯ is associated in some way with a particular operator Aˆ, then, for any
measurable function f : IR → IR, the function f(A¯) should be associated
with the operator f(Aˆ).
This preservation of functional relations can be represented neatly in the
language of category theory by saying that a quantisation of the set of all
classical quantities corresponds to a covariant functor Q : M → O that is
defined (i) on an object A¯ in M as Q(A¯) := Aˆ; and (ii) on a morphism
fM : B¯ → A¯, by
Q(fM) := fO. (3.8)
This is because fM : B¯ → A¯, means that B¯ = f ◦ A¯; and fO : Bˆ → Aˆ, means
that Bˆ = f(Aˆ).
3.2 Motivating Sieve-valued Valuations for Classical
Physics
Since classical physics suffers no ‘Kochen-Specker prohibitions’ on global val-
uations of the orthodox kind, the motivation in Section 2.3.2 for sieve-valued
valuations—as being naturally associated with partial valuations—seems not
to apply to classical physics. But, in fact, the notion of a classical macrostate
motivates the classical analogue of a partial valuation, and thereby leads to
the associated sieve-valued valuations. This Subsection describes the role of
the notion of a macrostate; and the next Subsection develops the idea so
as to give the exact classical analogue of the partial valuations discussed in
Section 2.3.2, and of the associated generalised valuations.
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So suppose we are given, not a microstate s ∈ S, but only a macrostate,
represented by some Borel subset R ⊆ S: what then can be said about the
‘value’ of a quantity A, or the truth-value of a proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’? Various
responses are possible9: for example, the obvious choice is simply to say that
the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is true in the macrostate R if A¯(R) ⊆ ∆, and false
otherwise. Thus ‘A ∈ ∆’ is defined to be true if, for all microstates s in R,
the value A¯(s) lies in the subset ∆.
However, one may feel that this assignment of true and false is rather
undiscriminating in so far as the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ is adjudged false ir-
respective of whether A¯(s) fails to be in ∆ for all s ∈ R, or does so only
for a ‘few’ points. For this reason, a more refined response is to say that
one wants the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ to be ‘more true’, the greater the set of
such points s: an idea that can be implemented by defining, for example, a
generalised truth-value υR(A ∈ ∆) of the proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ to be the set
of such points:
υR(A ∈ ∆) := R ∩ A¯−1[∆]. (3.9)
Thus the set of possible truth-values of ‘A ∈ ∆’ is the Boolean algebra of
Borel subsets of R ⊆ S; the actual truth-value being the subset of R in
which the value of A¯ does belong to ∆. (So ‘totally true’ corresponds to the
first response’s ‘true’, and is represented by R itself; whereas ‘totally false’ is
represented by the empty set.) These two responses are certainly workable;
we discuss the second in another paper [2].
But a third response is much more similar to what we have discussed in
the quantum case. Namely, we note that even if A¯(R) is not a subset of
∆, there will be10 functions f : IR → IR with the property that the ‘coarse-
grained’ function f(A¯) := f ◦ A¯ : S → IR satisfies the weaker condition
f ◦ A¯(R) ⊆ f(∆); (so that, according to the first response above, the weaker
9The most familiar response is that in order to assign values, we must do statistical
physics; i.e., we must have some probability measure µ defined on S, so that we say the
probability that the value of A lies in ∆, given that the macrostate is R, is: Prob(A ∈
∆;R) = µ(R∩A−1[∆])/µ(R). But we are asking what can be said about values, supposing
we are not doing statistical physics.
10The assertion ‘will be’ is on the assumption that constant functions on S are admitted.
Such trivial functions are the classical analogues of real multiples of the unit operator 1ˆ in
quantum physics, and—if desired—they can be removed from the base category M; just
as the quantum category O can be replaced with the category O∗ in which multiples of 1ˆ
are removed.
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proposition ‘f(A) ∈ f(∆)’ is true in the macrostate R). And we then define
the generalised truth-value νR(A ∈ ∆) of the original proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’
to be the set of all such coarse-grainings of A¯. Formally, in terms of the
category M:
νR(A ∈ ∆) := {fM : B¯ → A¯ | B¯(R) ⊆ f(∆)}. (3.10)
It is straightforward to check that the right hand side of Eq. (3.10) is a
sieve on A¯. Furthermore, νR(A ∈ ∆) has (classical analogues of) all the
other properties listed in Section 2.3.3 as clauses of the general definition of
a generalised valuation—as we shall discuss in the next Subsection.
3.3 The Classical Analogue of Generalised Valuations
We will now generalize the use in Section 3.2 of macrostates to motivate
sieve-valued valuations, to obtain the classical analogue of the generalised
valuations in Section 2.3.2 associated with any partial valuation. All the
properties discussed in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 (and incorporated as clauses
of the definition of a generalised valuation)—in particular, the sieve-analogue
of FUNC—will carry over to this classical setting.
We begin by noting that a macrostate R ⊆ S is naturally associated with
a classical partial valuation V R (i.e., an assignment to some quantities of
numbers as values, obeying a classical version of FUNC ). First we define the
domain of V R to be the set of all measurable functions on S that are constant
on the subset R:
domV R := {A¯ : S → IR | ∀s1, s2 ∈ R, A¯(s1) = A¯(s2)}. (3.11)
Then we define the value of a quantity A whose representative function A¯
lies in the domain of domV R, by
V R(A¯) := A¯(s0) (3.12)
for any s0 ∈ R; since A¯ is constant on R, the result does not depend on the
choice of s0 in R. So V
R(A¯) ∈ S(A¯). It also follows that domV R is closed
under coarse-graining, and that the values of V R obey FUNC . That is, we
have, just as in the definition of a partial valuation in Section 2.3.2: if A¯ ∈
domV R and B¯ = f(A¯) then (i) B¯ ∈ domV R; and (ii) V R(B¯) = f(V R(A¯)).
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This prompts us to define a classical partial valuation in general (i.e.,
regardless of specifying a macrostate) as an assignment V to each element
A¯ belonging to some subset domV of M, of a member of S(A¯), such that
if B¯ = f(A¯) then (i) B¯ ∈ domV and (ii) V (B¯) = f(V (A¯)). With this
definition, claims (1) and (2) of Section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 carry over completely
to the classical case: we simply substitute M for O (and so A¯ for Aˆ etc.)
and the ‘classical spectrum’ S(A¯) for σ(Aˆ). Thus we claim:
1. Given such a partial valuation V , there is a natural associated valuation
that: (i) is defined on all propositions ‘A ∈ ∆’; and (ii) assigns to such
a proposition as its value, a sieve on A¯ in the category M. Namely:
νV (A ∈ ∆) := {fM : B¯ → A¯ | B¯ ∈ domV, V (B) ∈ f(∆)}. (3.13)
Furthermore, the properties of these valuations, in particular the ana-
logue for sieves of the property FUNC , carry over completely from the
quantum to the classical case.
2. Accordingly, we can use these properties to generalise the notion of
a valuation, i.e., to define a generalised valuation as a map that (i)
assigns a sieve on A¯ to each proposition ‘A ∈ ∆’ and (ii) has these
properties.
We can also present our collection of sets of propositions at each stage
A¯ as a classical coarse-graining presheafG that (i) assigns to each A¯ the
Boolean algebra of propositions of the form ‘A ∈ ∆’ (or, equivalently,
the algebra of characteristic functions χ∆: the classical analogue of
the spectral projectors in quantum theory) identified as the Boolean
algebra of Borel subsets ∆ ⊆ S(A¯); and (ii) acts on morphisms fM :
B → A such that G(fM) coarsens propositions, in exact analogy to
Eq. (2.22).
But we shall not rehearse all the definitions, and verifications of properties,
substantiating these claims. For firstly, they carry over directly from the
discussion in (I) of the quantum case; and secondly, we shall see in the
Sections to follow that many of these definitions and properties apply much
more widely than in classical and quantum physics.
Something that is worth developing a little further however, is the obser-
vation that—as in the quantum case—the situation can arise in which f(∆)
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is not a Borel subset of IR, even though ∆ is. In this context, we note that
the central reason why it is feasible to regard Eq. (2.23) as a definition of
Eˆ[f(A) ∈ f(∆)] if f(∆) is not Borel, is that the lattice of projection opera-
tors is complete, and hence the right hand side of Eq. (2.23) is well-defined.
A natural analogue of this construction in the classical case would be to
start with the Hilbert space L2(S, dµ), where dµ is the natural measure on
the classical state space (a 2n-dimensional symplectic manifold, where n is
the number of degrees of freedom) S formed by taking the wedge-product
n-times of the basic symplectic 2-form on S. Any proposition A ∈ ∆ can
then be associated with a corresponding projection operator on this Hilbert
space: namely, the projection onto the Borel subset A−1(∆). An analogous
trick to that in Eq. (2.23) can then be applied by using the projection lat-
tice on the separable Hilbert space L2(S, dµ). However, we shall not go into
the mathematical details here since, in the present paper, our invocation of
the classical example is intended primarily to be of pedagogical value as an
illustration of the general concepts that will be discussed in the next Section.
Finally, for the sake of completeness, we remark on the classical analogue
of claim (3) of Section 2.3.4: the claim that an orthodox quantum state, a
vector ψ ∈ H or a density matrix ρ, induces a generalised valuation. For
ψ ∈ H, we defined (see Eq. (2.26))
νψ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]ψ = ψ}
= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆);ψ) = 1} (3.14)
where ∆ is a Borel subset of the spectrum σ(Aˆ) of Aˆ. In the classical case, for
s ∈ S, and ∆ a Borel subset of the ‘classical spectrum’ S(A¯), the analogue
of Eq. (3.14) is clearly
νs(A ∈ ∆) := {fM : B¯ → A¯ | χ[B∈f(∆)](s) = 1} = {fM : B¯ → A¯ | f(A¯(s)) ∈ f(∆)}
(3.15)
where χ[B∈f(∆)] is the characteristic function for B¯
−1(f(∆)). It is easy to see
that the sieve νs(A ∈ ∆) is the principal sieve, 1Ω(A) =↓A (so that in the
language of Section 2.3.2, ‘A ∈ ∆’ is totally true) if and only if A¯(s) ∈ ∆.
One can check that νs has all the properties required in the definition of a
generalised valuation (items (i) to (iv) in Section 2.3.3).
Furthermore, there is a corresponding classical analogue of the definition
of the generalised valuation νρ associated with a density matrix ρ:
νρ(A ∈ ∆) := {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | Prob(B ∈ f(∆); ρ) = 1} (3.16)
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= {fO : Bˆ → Aˆ | tr(ρ Eˆ[B ∈ f(∆)]) = 1}.
Namely: the classical analogue is that, with ρ now representing a classical
mixed state, i.e., a probability measure on S:
νρ(A ∈ ∆) := {fM : B¯ → A¯ | Probρ(B ∈ f(∆)) = 1} (3.17)
where Probρ(B ∈ f(∆)) is the classical statistical probability, according to ρ,
that ‘B ∈ f(∆)’, i.e., the ρ-measure ρ(B¯−1(f(∆))) of B¯−1(f(∆)). It follows
that the sieve νρ(A ∈ ∆) is the principal sieve, 1Ω(A) =↓A if and only if
ρ(A¯−1(∆)) = 1, i.e. if and only if ‘A ∈ ∆’ is certain according to ρ.
4 General Properties of Sieve-valued Valua-
tions
In this Section and the next, we turn to showing how sieve-valued valuations
arise much more generally than just in the examples of quantum and classical
physics discussed earlier. Indeed, we claim that they are one of the most
natural notions of valuation for any presheaf of propositions, no matter what
their topic. In claiming this we will assume about valuations only the basic
idea that they must be some sort of structure-preserving function from the
sets of contextualised propositions (with some such operations as negation,
conjunction etc. defined on it) to the corresponding sets of truth values, which
are to be some sort of logical algebra.
In this Section, we will argue for this claim by displaying how some of the
principal ideas and results of Section 4.2 and Section 5 of (I)—specifically,
the sieve-version of FUNC already emphasised in Sections 2 and 3 above,
and the notion of ‘coarse-graining’—can be greatly generalized so that, for
the most part, they apply to any presheaf of propositions. Another argument
for the claim will be presented in Section 5 of the present paper.
4.1 The Role of FUNC
In this Subsection, we introduce our most general version of FUNC ; and
motivate it and the idea of a sieve-valued valuation on an arbitrary presheaf of
propositionsG, by showing that together they define natural transformations
from G to Ω, and hence subobjects of G.
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Let C be any small category, with objects A,B, . . .; and let G be any
presheaf on C, with the set G(A) having elements d, e, . . .. We think of the
pair [A, d] as specifying a proposition at the context, or stage of truth, A;
and so of G as a presheaf of propositions. We call a function ν that assigns
to each choice of object A and each d ∈ G(A), a set of morphisms in C to A
(i.e., morphisms with A as codomain), a morphism-valued valuation on G.
We write the values of this function as ν(A, d).
Note that for any set S of morphisms to A (not necessarily a sieve), and
any f : B → A, we can define a pull-back to B of S by Eq. (2.4):
f ∗(S) := {h : C → B | f ◦ h ∈ S} (4.1)
although we note that there is no compelling reason for this definition if
the sets S are totally unrestricted. However, this caveat notwithstanding,
we will say that a morphism-valued valuation satisfies generalized functional
composition—for short, FUNC—if for all A,B and f : B → A and all
d ∈ G(A), it obeys
ν(B,G(f)(d)) = f ∗(ν(A, d)). (4.2)
We call a morphism-valuation on G a sieve-valued valuation on G if its
values are all sieves; in this case Eq. (4.1) is much better motivated since
the pull-back of a sieve is itself a sieve. The discussion in Section 2 already
supplies us with two motivations for using sieve-valuations in this very general
setting. First, from a logical perspective: if we think of G(A) as a set of
propositions, we expect a value ν(A, d) of such a proposition to be some sort
of truth-value. And we saw in Section 2 how Ω supplies a well-behaved set
of contextual and generalized truth-values.
Second, and more generally: for any presheaf G, a natural notion of a
valuation on G is a subobject of G. For think, as in logic, of a valuation as
specifying the ‘selected’ or ‘winning’ elements d in each G(A). One naturally
imagines that these selected elements might form a subobject of G. But
we saw in Section 2 that subobjects are in one-one correspondence with
morphisms, i.e., natural transformations, N : G → Ω. So one expects that
at least some sieve-valued valuations will define such a natural transformation
by NνA(d) := ν(A, d).
This motivation for sieve-valued valuations leads directly to FUNC . For
it turns out that FUNC is exactly the condition a sieve-valued valuation
must obey in order to thus define a natural transformation, i.e., a subobject
of G. Specifically, we have (cf. Theorem 4.2 of (I)),
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Theorem 4.1 A sieve-valued valuation ν on G obeys FUNC if and only if
the functions at each stage of truth A
NνA(d) := ν(A, d) (4.3)
define a natural transformation Nν from G to Ω.
Proof
Suppose f : B → A, so that naturalness means that the composite map
G(A)
Nν
A−→ Ω(A)
Ω(f)
−→ Ω(B) is equal to G(A)
G(f)
−→ G(B)
Nν
B−→ Ω(B). But
given that NνA(d) := ν(A, d), this is the condition that
Ω(f)(ν(A, d)) = (NνB ◦G(f))(d) = ν(B,G(f)(d)) (4.4)
which is exactly FUNC . Q.E.D.
To sum up: we conclude that sieve-valued valuations obeying FUNC are
a very natural notion of valuation on any presheaf of propositions
4.2 Coarse-Graining Presheaves
In this Subsection, we will generalize one of the main notions in Section 5 of
(I): the idea of generalized coarse-graining. Our generalization of this notion
involves the use of a new map, called the comparison functor ; this will also
be needed in Section 5 in our general discussion of the logic of partial truth.
There are two main ways in which we shall generalize the idea of coarse-
graining:
1. In (I), the set of ‘propositions’ G(Aˆ) at each stage Aˆ was a Boolean
algebra (of Borel subsets of σ(Aˆ), or equivalently of Aˆ’s spectral projec-
tors; and similarly for the classical case, cf. Section 3). However, here
we shall assume only that G(A) is a poset with a 0 and a 1. Indeed,
much of what follows could be generalized to the case where G(A) is
just a poset; but we will also require a 0 and a 1, to link to the null,
exclusivity and monotonicity clauses of the definition of a generalised
valuation, Eqs. (2.17–2.19) (see Eqs. (4.7–4.9) below).
2. In (I), generalized coarse-graining was defined so as to use, for the case
where fO : Bˆ → Aˆ, the identity map on G(Bˆ) to embed the Boolean
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algebraG(Bˆ) into its superset (larger Boolean algebra)G(Aˆ) (this was
used in writing Eq. (2.22)). In the generalization in this Subsection to
any presheaf of propositions G on any small category C, such that
G(A) is a poset with a 0 and 1, we will again need a map acting in
the opposite direction to G(f). But it need not be the identity map,
since the poset G(B) need not be a subset of G(A). So we will simply
assume that there is some such map (given by the comparison functor
introduced in Paragraph 1 below).
We should also note another way in which the exposition to follow differs
from that in Section 5 of (I). There, our discussion took as the base-category,
not O, but the poset W of all Boolean subalgebras of the projection lattice
P(H) of the Hilbert space H. In this category11, the objects are defined to
be the subalgebras W ∈ W; and a morphism is defined to exist from W2
to W1 if W2 ⊆ W1: thus there is at most one morphism between any two
objects. In some respects W is a more natural category to work with than
O, since it ‘identifies’ quantities that are each a function of the other, and
hence have the same spectral algebra.
For this reason, in (I) we sometimes worked with W, rather than O.
In particular, the Kochen-Specker theorem gets as natural an expression in
terms of W, as it does in terms of O. But, for the sake of brevity, in the
review of (I) in the present paper we have used only the category O (and
its classical analogue M). And again in this Subsection, while generalizing
Section 5 of (I), we will present our definitions and results in terms of the
category C, which we have hitherto thought of as generalizing O. So for
the rest of this Subsection, we assume as in Section 4.1 that C is any small
category, with objects A,B, . . .; and that G is a presheaf on C, with the set
G(A) having elements d, e, . . .. We also assume that at each A, G(A) is a
poset with a 0 and a 1.
1. The Comparison Functor: In Section 5 below, given a morphism
f : B → A, we shall need to be able to ‘push-forward’ a proposition d ∈ G(B)
11In a similar way, one can make a category out of any poset; in particular, the cor-
responding category for classical physics will consist of all Boolean subalgebras of the
algebra (itself Boolean!) of all Borel subsets of the classical state space S, again ordered
by subalgebra inclusion.
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to G(A), for comparison of ‘logical strength’ (i.e., comparison according to
the partial order < in the poset G(A)) with propositions in G(A).
In (I), this presented no problem since, in using the base category W,
we have that d ∈ G(B)(= W2) is itself also a member of G(A)(= W1), (if
f : W2 → W1, so that W2 ⊆ W1). But with a general category C, this fails
since there is no a priori embedding of G(B) in G(A).
Accordingly, we now assume that such a map is given. More precisely,
we assume that whenever f : B → A in C, we are given a map from G(B) to
G(A), which need not be injective. For much of the argument to follow, we
do not need to assume that these maps mesh under composition so as to give
a (covariant) functor from C to Set, but for simplicity, we will do so. Thus
we assume that there is a covariant functor, C, from C to Set, called the
comparison functor (‘C’ for ‘comparison’), with the same action on objects
A in C as has G. To sum up:
• C(A) := G(A) at all A;
• if f : B → A, there is a map C(f) : C(B)→ C(A).
2. Coarse-Graining Presheaves: We turn now to the main topic of
this Subsection, which is to generalize the discussion in (I), Section 5, of
generalized coarse-graining. In effect, that discussion proceeded by noting
three properties of the original coarse-graining presheafG : O → Set (defined
in Section 2.3.3 above); and then defining a coarse-graining presheaf to be
any presheaf with these properties. These properties were called ‘coarse-
graining’, ‘retraction’ and ‘monotonicity’; but we need not list them. (We
say ‘in effect’, just because the definition was in terms of the category W,
not O.)
Here, we will generalize to any small category C. The idea is to take the
comparison functor C to be given ab initio, and then to define a presheaf G
to be a ‘coarse-graining’ with respect toC, if it has these three properties—or
rather, their generalizations, to allow for C(f) not necessarily being a subset
inclusion map.
So we assume we are given a covariant functor C from C to Set, with all
the C(A) being posets with a 0 and 1. Then we define a coarse-graining with
respect to C to be a presheaf G on C (i.e., a contravariant functor from C to
Set), with the following properties:
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1) G has the same action on objects as C, i.e., G(A) := C(A);
2) ‘coarse-graining’: if f : B → A, then for all d ∈ G(A),
d ≤ C(f)[G(f)(d)]; (4.5)
3) ‘monotonicity’: if f : B → A, and d ≤ e in G(A), then G(f)(d) ≤
G(f)(e) in G(B).
In (I) we also added the condition
4) ‘generalized retraction’: if f : B → A, then for all d ∈ G(B),
G(f)[C(f)(d)] = d (4.6)
but we note that if this extra condition Eq. (4.6) is imposed, then the map
C(f) : G(B) → G(A) is necessarily injective (i.e., it is one-to-one); and
hence we have only a marginal generalisation of the situation in (I) in which
G(B) is an explicit subset of G(A). On the other hand, the motivation for
imposing the generalised retraction condition in the first place was closely
linked to the fact that G(B) is a subset of G(A) in the example of quantum
theory; therefore it is legitimate to consider removing this condition, with
a concomitant freeing up of possibilities for the comparison-functor maps
C(f) : G(B)→ G(A).
3. Generalised Valuations on a general Coarse-graining Presheaf:
The general notion of a coarse-graining presheaf just introduced admits gen-
eralised valuations of the FUNC -obeying kind originally envisaged in (I) and
in Section 4.1.
The first step is to define a local valuation of the poset G(A) in the
Heyting algebra Ω(A). This is to be a map φ : G(A)→ Ω(A) such that the
following conditions are satisfied:
Null proposition condition : φ(0G(A)) = 0Ω(A) (4.7)
Monotonicity : α ≤ β implies φ(α) ≤ φ(β) (4.8)
Exclusivity : If α ∧ β = 0G(A) and φ(α) = 1Ω(A), then φ(β) < 1Ω(A)(4.9)
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which are the appropriate analogues of Eq. (2.17), Eq. (2.18) and Eq. (2.19)
respectively.
Now we define a generalised valuation on C associated with a coarse-
graining presheaf G (G being with respect to some comparison functor C)
to be a family of local valuations φA : G(A) → Ω(A), at each A, such that
if f : B → A then, for all d ∈ G(A),
φB(G(f)(d)) = f
∗(φA(d)). (4.10)
Bearing in mind that this equation is essentially FUNC, Eq. (4.2), and that
local valuations obey the null proposition, monotonicity and exclusivity con-
ditions in Eqs. (4.7–4.8), we see that this definition directly generalizes the
generalised valuations on O of Section 2.3.3. So the definition is non-empty.
In particular: in (I), Section 5.3.4, we showed that a density matrix defines
such a generalised valuation on the specific category W, associated with any
coarse-graining presheaf on W. A similar result can be proved for the clas-
sical case, using the material at the end of Section 3 above, especially Eq.
(3.17).
Finally, we remark that since these generalised valuations for an arbitrary
coarse-graining presheaf G (with respect to an arbitrary comparison func-
tor) obey FUNC , the discussion of Section 4.1 applies. That is: each such
generalised valuation, Φ say, (a family of local valuations φA) defines a natu-
ral transformation NΦ from the coarse-graining presheaf G to the subobject
classifier Ω, by defining the components:
NΦA (d) := φA(d) (4.11)
As emphasised in Section 2.2, such natural transformations are in one-to-
one correspondence with subobjects. Thus each such generalised valuation
defines a subobject of G.
5 The Logic of Partial Truth
We turn now to give our final motivation for the use of sieve-valued val-
uations. We start from a handful of general intuitive requirements about
how the truth-values of propositions should reflect their logical relations,
and argue that sieve-valued valuations are the natural way to satisfy these
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requirements. More precisely: valuations taking sieves as their values are de-
termined in a natural way, for any category C of ‘contexts’, once we require
the following:
(i) each object in the category has an associated family of propositions,
with different families corresponding to different objects families mesh-
ing suitably;
(ii) the valuation is to represent partial truth (degrees of truth), subject
to some weak conditions, the most important being that the partial
truth-value of a proposition at a stage A in C is to be determined by
which of its consequences (weaker propositions) are totally true at their
own stage.
The concrete valuations discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3 (and in (I)) arise
from applying these requirements to propositions about the values of physical
quantities.
We emphasise that although we think conditions in (ii) on partial truth
are very reasonable, we make no claim that they are obligatory. In the
philosophical literature, partial truth is modelled in various ways, and indeed
often rejected altogether (for example, [6]). We discuss this more in [2].
Here, suffice it to say in defence of our own notion that at least it is tightly
controlled by the notion of total truth, in the sense that the partial truth-
value of any proposition is determined by which propositions are totally true.
Our argument will be very general: indeed, the only precise mathemat-
ical notion that is needed is that of a sieve in a category. Otherwise, the
argument can be formulated intuitively: for example, in its use of the idea
of one proposition being a consequence of (logically weaker than) another.
Of course, by assuming mathematical notions in addition to that of a cate-
gory, these intuitive ideas can be made precise. But it seems to us best to
emphasise the generality of the intuitive argument by assuming these further
notions only after giving the argument.
We will therefore proceed in two subsections. Subsection 1 will give the
intuitive argument that assumes only the notion of a category, and leads
to sieve-valued valuations. Subsection 2 will comment on the argument,
and exhibit one natural way of making its intuitive ideas precise: in par-
ticular, making consequence (entailment) precise by having the families of
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propositions at each stage be posets, and having embedding maps like the
comparison functor introduced in Section 4.2.
5.1 The Intuitive Argument for Sieve-valued Valua-
tions
Suppose we are given some category C, and that to each object A ∈ C is
associated a set P(A) whose elements d we will call ‘items’. We allow that
for different objects A,B in C, the sets P(A), P(B) can differ. For each A
and d ∈ P(A) we think of [A, d] as a proposition. We do not require that
for fixed A, the family {[A, d] | d ∈ P(A)} is a Boolean algebra; nor, for the
moment, that it have any other structure—for example, that of a poset. But
we do require the following assumptions.
(A) The morphisms in the category are associated with maps between
propositions for different objects, as follows. If there is a morphism
f : B → A from B to A, then there is a function from the fam-
ily of propositions {[A, d] | d ∈ P(A)} to the corresponding family
{[B, e] | e ∈ P(B)} associated with B. We represent this map as-
sociated with f by f † acting on the items d. So given a morphism
f : B → A, then [B, f †(d)] is the ‘B-proposition’ that ‘corresponds by
f ’ to [A, d]. Furthermore, recalling that every object A in a category
has an identity morphism, idA : A → A, we require that the map on
propositions associated with the identity morphism be the identity map
on propositions. That is: we require that for any A, (idA)
† = idP(A).
Two remarks about this assumption.
(a) We do not initially require that the associations A 7→ P(A) and
f 7→ f † together define a presheaf on C. That is: we do not need
to assume that, given morphisms f : B → A and g : C → B, and
so a morphism f ◦ g : C → A, we have: g†(f †(d)) = (f ◦ g)†(d).
However, we note en passant that if this presheaf condition is not
satisfied, then the ‘†’-operation is ‘path-dependent’ in the follow-
ing sense: If a morphism k : C → A can be factored in the form
C
g
→ B
f
→ A, then the pull-back k†(d) of d ∈ P(A) may not
equal the composite pull-back g†(f †(d)) obtained by factoring k
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through the intermediate object B. In most physical situations,
such a behaviour would be considered distinctly pathological.
(b) To use the notationG(f) instead of f † would echo the notation in
Section 4.2 (and its special cases, Definitions 5.3 and 5.4 of (I)).
But we use f † to indicate that we do not require a presheaf. See
the next subsection for how the argument to come can be carried
over to any coarse-graining presheaf in the sense of Section 4.2.
(B) For any morphism f : B → A, and any proposition [A, d], the corre-
sponding B-proposition [B, f †(d)] is intuitively logically weaker than
(a consequence of) [A, d]. Again, two remarks about this assumption.
(a) To accommodate the identity morphism, and the requirement of
(A) that (idA)
† = idP(A), we note that ‘weaker’ here means ‘strictly
weaker or the same as’, just as ‘≤’ means ‘is less than or equal
to’. Similarly for ‘consequence’.
(b) Again: it is enough at this stage to use ‘logically weaker’ in an
intuitive sense, so as to motivate the requirements in (C) below.
Subsection 2 will make it precise, in terms of each object’s family
of propositions being a poset and there being a comparison functor
between them.
(C) We propose to assign to each proposition [A, d] a truth-value ν(A, d).
There is to be one truth-value, called ‘total truth’ (as against the other
‘partially true’ values), that is subject to the following intuitive require-
ments:
(a) If [A, d] is totally true, so are all its weakenings (consequences)
[B, f †(d)]; (note that since assumption (A) required (idA)
† =
idP(A), [A, d] is one of its own weakenings, and so the converse
statement is automatic).
(b) If [A, d] is partially true (i.e., has one of the other truth-values),
it is in some intuitive sense ‘more true’, or ‘nearer being totally
true’, the more of its weakenings [B, f †(d)] are totally true.
(c) The truth-value ν(A, d), is to be determined by which of the weak-
enings [B, f †(d)] of [A, d] is totally true: determined in some way
that obeys (a) and (b) above.
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Three remarks about assumption (C). First: part (c) is perhaps less in-
tuitive than parts (a) and (b); but it can be motivated by the philosophical
idea that the semantic value or ‘content’ of a sentence is determined by the
set of those of its consequences that are true (in the usual classical two-
valued sense)—we discuss this in [2]. Second: part (c) can also be defended
as likely to mollify sceptics about partial truth. For it makes the notion of
partial truth tightly controlled by the more acceptable notion of total truth:
once the maps f † and the set of totally true propositions is given, the par-
tial truth-values of all propositions are fixed—and fixed ‘individually’ in that
the partial truth-value of [A, d] depends only on which of its weakenings are
totally true. In any case, we now assume (c). Third: one might propose as
intuitive a variant of (b), namely (b′): if [A, d] is partially true, it is more
true (i.e., nearer total truth), the more of its weakenings [B, f †(d)] are near
to total truth. But we will make no use of this.
Given these assumptions, the intuitive argument proceeds in two steps.
First, these assumptions, especially part (c) of (C), prompt a very natural
suggestion for what ν(A, d) should be. Namely:
(M): ν(A, d) is to be the set of those morphisms f : B → A
with the property that the corresponding proposition, [B, f †(d)]
is totally true. In symbols:
ν(A, d) = {f : B → A | [B, f †(d)] is totally true } (5.1)
(We write ‘(M)’ for ‘morphisms’.) This suggestion makes ν(A, d) determined
by which weakenings of [A, d] are totally true, as required by (C) part (c):
indeed, determined very simply.
Second, one naturally asks: what is it for a proposition, whether [B, f †(d)]
or [A, d], to be totally true? That is not yet settled. But again there is a
very natural suggestion, obeying parts (a) and (b) of (C). Namely:
(T): For any proposition [A, d], total truth is just ν(A, d) being
the set of all morphisms, f : B → A, to A, i.e., the principal
sieve on A. In symbols:
[A, d] is totally true if ν(A, d) =↓A (5.2)
(We write ‘(T)’ for ‘total truth’.) This suggestion is natural, because when
taken together with (M):
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a) it follows that part (a) of (C) holds;
b) it follows that part (b) of (C) holds, in a very natural sense of the
phrase ‘[A, d] is more true’, namely that ν(A, d) is a larger subset of
↓A.
Finally, to complete the intuitive argument: it follows immediately from (M)
and (T) taken together that ν(A, d) is a sieve. For recall that, for any object
A in a category C, a set S of morphisms to A is a sieve if and only if the
pull-back along any morphism in S is the principal sieve.
5.2 Assessing the Argument
We will make two comments on the argument in the last Subsection, and
then describe how to make it precise using the ideas in Section 4.2.
First, we emphasise that the intuitive argument is not a genuine deduc-
tion of valuations being sieve-valued. It only claims that (M) and (T) (and
therefore, sieve-valued valuations) are natural, given (A) to (C). One could
perhaps get a genuine deduction of ν(A, d) being a sieve, but only at the
price of some strong premises. Indeed, the obvious stronger premises that
one might consider do not quite imply (M) and (T); they just make them
even more natural than they were in Subsection 1. Thus suppose we added
as premises, both:
(D) The truth-value ν(A, d) is some set of morphisms to A;
(T) Total truth is to be just ν(A, d) being the principal sieve on
A. In symbols: [A, d] is totally true if and only if ν(A, d) =↓A.
Even these two do not imply (M); though they make it extremely natural
to accept (M), and therefore to accept (as in the argument in Subsection 1)
ν(A, d) being a sieve.
More generally, we agree that essentially the same argument can be given
different versions; and we make no claim to the version in Subsection 1
being the unique best balance between premises being plausible and the
inference being rigorously deductively valid. (We admit that in philosophical
argument, we tend to weigh the former more highly, as shown by our choice
of version in Subsection 1.)
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Second, we note that the fact that ν(A, d) is a sieve implies the special
case of our sieve-version of FUNC , viz. the case when f : B → A ∈ ν(A, d).
For by the construction above:
ν(B, f †(d)) =↓B; (5.3)
while by the definition of a sieve, and that fact that f : B → A ∈ ν(A, d),
f ∗(ν(A, d)) =↓B. (5.4)
But nothing in the argument implies our sieve-version of FUNC in full gen-
erality, i.e., the principle that even when f : B → A 6∈ ν(A, d)
ν(B, f †(d)) = f ∗(ν(A, d)). (5.5)
On the other hand, as we saw in Section 4.1, FUNC can be motivated by
the requirement that a valuation determines a subobject of G.
Finally, we round off this Section by showing how to make the intuitive
argument precise by using the notions of Section 4.2. We only need to make
assumptions (A) to (C) precise: the argument then proceeds as in Section
5.1. So, first: we can make (A) precise by requiring that (i) each of the
sets P(A) be a poset with a 0 and a 1; and (ii) the map A 7→ P(A) define
a presheaf—as explained above, this requirement is natural in view of the
likely existence of factorisations of morphisms k : C → A. From now on,
we call this presheaf G, as in Section 4.2 (and earlier). So P(A) = G(A)
and f † = G(f). Note that the fact that G is a presheaf now implies our
requirement that (idA)
† = idP(A), i.e., G(idA) = idG(A).
Second, to make (B) precise: whenever f : B → A, we need to be
able to ‘push-forward’ a proposition [B,G(f)(d)]—or, in our other notation,
G(f)(d) ∈ G(B)—to G(A) for comparison of ‘logical strength’ (i.e., com-
parison according to the partial order < inG(A)) with the proposition [A, d],
i.e., with d ∈ G(A). And the pushed proposition is required to be weaker
(i.e., higher in the partial order) than [A, d]. So we require:
• There is a comparison functor in the (weak) sense of Section 4.2.1, i.e.,
a covariant functor C from C to Set with the same action on objects A
in C as has G: C(A) := G(A).
• The functors C and G together obey generalized coarse-graining, Eq.
(4.5), i.e.:
d ≤ C(f)[G(f)(d)]. (5.6)
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The generalized retraction and monotonicity clauses in the definition in Sec-
tion 4.2 of a generalized coarse-graining presheaf are not needed a priori ,
although we note that the monotonicity condition is particularly natural.
Finally, (C) can be rendered precise by requiring that the set of truth-
values be a poset with a 1 (representing ‘totally true’); and that assignments
of truth values, ν, should obey the following conditions:
(a) If ν(A, d) = 1, then for any f : B → A, ν(B,G(f)(d)) = 1.
(b) Suppose [A, d] and [A, e] are such that whenever f : B → A, if ν(B,G(f)(d)) =
1, then also ν(B,G(f)(e)) = 1. Then:
ν(A, d) < ν(A, e). (5.7)
(c) ν(A, d) is determined by the set {[B,G(f)(d)] | f : B → A, and ν(B,G(f)(d)) =
1}.
Given these assumptions, the argument for sieve-valued valuations, i.e., for
the set of truth-values at each A in C being Ω(A), can proceed just as in
Section 5.1, though with the new notation, G, C, etc.
6 Conclusion
To conclude, let us summarize some of our main proposals (both in (I) and
this paper), referring mainly to the physical cases (quantum and classical).
(1) We consider the set of physical quantities as a mathematical category,
with morphisms given by coarse-graining, i.e., taking functions of quantities.
So in quantum theory, we consider the category O of bounded self-adjoint
operators on a Hilbert space H, with a morphism from one such operator, Bˆ,
to another, Aˆ, whenever Bˆ is a function of Aˆ. Correspondingly, for classical
physics, we consider the category M of real-valued measurable functions on
a classical state space S, with a morphism from one such function, B¯, to
another, A¯, whenever B¯ is a function of A¯.
(2) We assign to each proposition, ‘A ∈ ∆’, (that says the value of the
quantity A lies in the Borel set ∆) as its value: a sieve on A—a sieve on
A being a set of morphisms to A, f : B → A that is closed under further
coarse-graining. (Here and in what follows, we use ‘A’ to stand indifferently
for a quantum or classical quantity, represented by Aˆ or A¯ respectively.)
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(3) The previous paper motivated this proposal, for quantum theory, by
linking the Kochen-Specker theorem to the theory of presheaves. For our
category Od of discrete-spectrum operators, the theorem states that if the
dimension of H is greater than 2, then there are no real-valued functions V
on Od that have the FUNC property,
V (f(Aˆ)) = f(V (Aˆ)). (6.1)
On the other hand, a presheaf is an assignment, to each object in a category,
of a set, such that the sets assigned to objects that are related by a mor-
phism, ‘mesh’ with each other by having a corresponding set-morphism, i.e.,
a function, between them.
The Kochen-Specker theorem turns out to be a statement about the
presheaf on O that assigns to each operator, its spectrum: the meshing
of this presheaf turns out to be very closely related to the meshing of val-
ues given by Eq. (6.1). Namely, the Kochen-Specker theorem says that this
presheaf has no global elements; where a global element is the analogue, for
presheaves, of the ordinary idea of an element of a set.
This situation suggests partial valuations on Od, i.e., real-valued func-
tions on a subset of Od that obey Eq. (6.1); and this led us to our proposed
sieve-valued valuations on all of O. These have a corresponding FUNC prop-
erty (expressed in terms of pull-backs of sieves) and other natural properties
(like Null proposition, and monotonicity); and yet they are defined on all
quantities.
(4) In this paper, we have motivated these proposals in three other ways.
First, we showed that they apply equally well to classical physics: in the ab-
sence of Kochen-Specker prohibitions, we considered how to define a valua-
tion given only a macrostate (Section 3). Second, we showed how some of our
main proposals carry over directly to the very general setting of any presheaf
of propositions on any small category: e.g. the equivalence of FUNC to a
sieve-valued valuation specifying a subobject (Section 4). Third, we showed
that our sieve-valued valuations are a very natural way to satisfy some gen-
eral intuitive requirements about partial truth, as applied to a presheaf of
propositions defined on any (small) category (Section 5). Here we emphasised
the point that for our valuations, the partial truth-value of a proposition is
determined by which of its weakenings are totally true.
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